How many soldiers could medieval kingdoms raise, and how wealthy were their rulers? A remarkable fifteenth-century Venetian document attempted to answer these questions, comparing the military strength and revenues of dozens of states across Europe, North Africa and Asia.
In the late Middle Ages, the Republic of Venice maintained an extensive network of merchants, diplomats and political contacts. Its leaders needed to understand the resources of neighbouring powers, whether they were allies, trading partners or potential enemies. One surviving document offers an extraordinary glimpse into how the Venetians assessed the balance of power across the medieval world.
Known as the Memorandum of the Power and Revenues of the States of Europe, the document provides estimates of how many mounted soldiers different rulers could maintain, both within their territories and on campaigns abroad. It also records the annual revenues of many states, comparing their financial position with earlier years.
Although the memorandum includes figures dating to 1423, it was not necessarily written in that year. The surviving account contains references to later developments, and the nineteenth-century editor of the translation explains that it was attached to material concerning the Venetian doge Tommaso Mocenigo before 1450. Its anonymous author appears to have drawn on information from different periods.
The figures are not always reliable, and some are clearly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the document provides a fascinating picture of how medieval observers understood the relative power of kingdoms, republics, duchies and empires.
England and France: Two Great Powers Weakened by War
The British Isles depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
The memorandum begins with France, estimating that the French king could raise 30,000 mounted soldiers from his own territories. These forces would come from the nobility, clergy, towns and other groups owing military service.
However, the document explains that maintaining soldiers on campaigns abroad was considerably more expensive. France could therefore send only 15,000 horsemen beyond its borders.
The report also claims that France had once been capable of raising 100,000 mounted soldiers, before internal warfare devastated the kingdom:
Before the war with their own countrymen, it could have raised 100,000, for that war destroyed both Church and revenues.
This assessment reflects the damage caused by the Hundred Years’ War and the civil conflict between the Armagnac and Burgundian factions. The English victory at Agincourt in 1415 and subsequent conquests had further weakened French royal authority.
England was assigned a similar military strength of 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. The document states that England had previously been able to maintain 40,000, but that warfare had diminished its resources.
France depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
The author considered the two kingdoms evenly matched:
In making the test of war these powers are equal. They have always been powerful in their undertakings. And if one of these forces had been greater than the other, one would have been destroyed.
Their finances were also believed to have deteriorated. French royal revenues had supposedly fallen from two million ducats in 1414 to one million, while England’s revenues had declined from two million to 700,000 ducats.
These figures cannot be accepted as precise measurements, but they demonstrate how strongly the memorandum associated prolonged warfare with declining military and financial power.
The British Isles, Scandinavia and Iberia
Scandinavia depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
Scotland and Norway were both described as extensive but impoverished countries. Each was credited with the potential to maintain 10,000 horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad.
The wording is somewhat cautious, suggesting that the rulers of these kingdoms would struggle to maintain such forces with the revenues available to them.
Iberia depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
In the Iberian Peninsula, the Kingdom of Castile was credited with 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad, compared with 20,000 maintained in 1414. Their annual revenues, however, had supposedly declined from three million ducats in 1410 to 800,000.
Portugal was estimated to have 6,000 horsemen at home and 3,000 abroad. Its revenues were said to have fallen from 200,000 ducats in 1410 to 140,000.
The memorandum also lists Brittany, whose ruler could supposedly maintain 8,000 horsemen at home and 4,000 abroad. Its revenues had declined from 200,000 to 140,000 ducats.
Another entry concerns the Master of St James, referring to the military order of Santiago. He was credited with 4,000 horsemen at home and 2,000 abroad.
Burgundy and the Italian States
Italy depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
Burgundy was among the most important political powers in Western Europe during the fifteenth century. Its dukes controlled territories in what is now France and the Low Countries, and their wealth and influence frequently rivalled those of kings.
The Venetian memorandum nevertheless assigns the Duke of Burgundy only 3,000 cavalry at home, compared with 1,000 in 1414. Curiously, it claims that he could maintain 5,000 men abroad, reversing the pattern found in most other entries.
Burgundy’s revenues were estimated at 900,000 ducats, down from three million in 1400. The report attributes the decline to warfare.
The Italian peninsula receives particularly detailed treatment, reflecting Venice’s close involvement in its political and military affairs. Milan was credited with 10,000 mercenary horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad. The document names Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan, providing an important clue about its chronology: Sforza did not become duke until 1450. This creates a difficulty with the editor’s statement that the memorandum had been attached to the other material before that year, suggesting that its dating or transmission requires further investigation.
The financial section separately mentions Filippo Maria Visconti, who ruled Milan until 1447. It claims that Milan’s revenues had declined from one million ducats in 1423 to 500,000.
Venice itself was assigned 10,000 horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad, while Florence was credited with 4,000 at home and 2,000 abroad.
Among the smaller Italian states, Savoy was credited with 8,000 horsemen at home and 4,000 abroad. Montferrat, Ferrara, Mantua, Bologna and Siena were each assigned 2,000 horsemen at home and 1,000 abroad. Genoa was also credited with 2,000 horsemen, although the report does not provide a corresponding figure for foreign campaigns.
Florence presents an interesting case. The memorandum claims that it could maintain 1,000 horsemen with its revenues of 1414, but 4,000 at the time of the assessment. Its finances, however, had supposedly declined from 400,000 ducats in 1423 to 200,000 because of warfare.
The Papal States were credited with 6,000 horsemen at home and 3,000 abroad, compared with 8,000 in 1414. Papal revenues were estimated at 400,000 ducats.
Genoa was another state whose military capabilities had supposedly declined. According to the memorandum, internal divisions and warfare had reduced its forces from 5,000 horsemen in 1414 to 2,000.
The document also includes the Kingdom of Naples, where the king of Aragon was credited with 12,000 horsemen at home and 6,000 abroad. The kingdom’s princes could supposedly raise another 4,000 at home. Barcelona and Catalonia were separately assigned 12,000 horsemen at home and 6,000 abroad.
Germany, Hungary and Poland: The Great Military Powers
Central Europe depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
Some of the largest military estimates were assigned to the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The memorandum treats the German lands collectively, including the Holy Roman Emperor, secular and ecclesiastical princes, and imperial cities. Together, these territories were believed capable of raising 60,000 horsemen at home and 30,000 abroad.
This did not mean that the emperor could automatically command such an army. The Holy Roman Empire consisted of numerous political authorities with different interests and obligations.
Hungary received an even higher estimate of 80,000 horsemen at home and 40,000 abroad, making it the most powerful Christian kingdom in the memorandum by this measure.
Hungary was ruled by Sigismund of Luxembourg, who also held the imperial title. Its position in Central Europe made it particularly important as the Ottoman Empire expanded into the Balkans.
Poland was credited with 50,000 horsemen at home and 25,000 abroad.
The Teutonic Order’s territories in Prussia were assigned 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. According to the report, the Order had been able to maintain 50,000 in 1414, but warfare had weakened it. This decline may reflect the consequences of the Teutonic Order’s conflicts with Poland and Lithuania, particularly its defeat at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410.
The figures suggest that Venetian observers regarded Central and Eastern Europe as possessing enormous military resources, even if these forces were not necessarily available to a single commander.
The Balkans, Greece and the Byzantine World
The Balkans depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
The memorandum also provides estimates for numerous states in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.
Wallachia was credited with 20,000 horsemen at home and 10,000 abroad. The Morea, in southern Greece, was supposedly capable of raising 50,000 horsemen in 1414. Warfare had reduced this to 20,000 at home and 10,000 abroad.
Another entry groups Albania, Croatia, Slavonia, Serbia, Russia and Bosnia together, assigning them a combined force of 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. This broad grouping makes the estimate difficult to interpret, since these territories did not constitute a single political or military power.
Cyprus was credited with 2,000 horsemen at home and 1,000 abroad. The Knights Hospitaller, based on Rhodes, were assigned 4,000 at home and 2,000 abroad.
The document also mentions the Duke of Nicae in the Archipelago, credited with 2,000 horsemen, and the Lord of Mytilene, with the same number. These entries reflect the fragmented political landscape of the Aegean, where Latin lordships continued to exist alongside Byzantine and Ottoman territories.
The Byzantine emperor in Constantinople is also listed, but the military figure was left blank. Further east, the Empire of Trebizond, a Byzantine successor state on the Black Sea coast, was assigned the surprisingly high figure of 25,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad.
Georgia was believed to have experienced a substantial decline. The memorandum claims that its military strength had fallen from 30,000 horsemen in 1414 to 10,000 at home and 5,000 abroad.
The Ottoman Empire and Other Muslim Powers
Anatolia depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
The memorandum did not limit itself to Christian states. A separate section assesses the military capabilities of several Muslim and Central Asian powers. The Ottoman ruler, referred to simply as the Turk, was credited with 40,000 horsemen. The author describes them as formidable soldiers capable of defending their territories against Christian enemies.
The principality of Karaman in Anatolia received an even larger estimate of 60,000 horsemen at home and 30,000 abroad.
Two other eastern rulers, named Ussun Cassan and the Caraifan in the translation, were each assigned 20,000 horsemen at home and 10,000 abroad. Their identities and the chronology of these entries require caution, particularly because the name Ussun Cassan appears to refer to Uzun Hasan, who became a major regional power later in the fifteenth century.
The memorandum also groups together Tunis, Granada and other North African cities whose ships were said to threaten Christian maritime interests. Collectively, they were credited with 100,000 horsemen at home and 50,000 abroad.
Such entries reflect Venice’s interest in the military and naval capabilities of powers beyond Christian Europe, especially those connected to Mediterranean trade and warfare.
Tamerlane and His Million Horsemen
Iranian and eastern Asian lands depicted in the Cosmographia Claudii Ptolomaei Alexandrini from the 15th century
Perhaps the most extraordinary figure in the entire memorandum concerns the Central Asian conqueror Timur, better known in Europe as Tamerlane. The report claims that he could raise an astonishing one million horsemen at home and send 500,000 abroad. These numbers are almost certainly enormous exaggerations. They also present another chronological problem: Timur had died in 1405.
His campaigns had devastated large parts of Central and Western Asia, and his victory over the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I at Ankara in 1402 had temporarily disrupted Ottoman expansion.
The inclusion of Tamerlane suggests that the memorandum incorporated outdated information or that his name continued to be used as a reference to the military power of the Timurids.
Whatever its explanation, the claim of one million horsemen demonstrates why the document must be treated as an assessment of perceived power rather than a reliable military census.
How Rich Were Medieval States?
Alongside its military estimates, the memorandum provides a separate account of the revenues of several Christian rulers.
These figures, expressed in ducats, offer an opportunity to compare how the author believed the financial resources of different states had changed.
The largest reported revenues belonged to the major kingdoms of Western Europe. France’s annual income had supposedly declined from two million to one million ducats, while England’s had fallen from two million to 700,000. The ruler identified as the king of Spain was said to have experienced an even greater decline, from three million to 800,000 ducats.
Similar reductions were reported elsewhere. Burgundy’s revenues had supposedly fallen from three million to 900,000 ducats, while Milan’s declined from one million to 500,000. Venice’s annual income was estimated to have fallen from 1.1 million to 800,000 ducats. Florence and Bologna were each credited with 200,000 ducats, compared with 400,000 in the earlier estimates.
The earlier figures do not all refer to the same year, ranging instead from 1400 to 1423. The comparisons therefore should not be understood as changes over a single, consistent period.
The striking feature is the repeated claim that warfare had reduced revenues. France, England, Spain, Burgundy and several Italian states were all believed to have suffered substantial financial losses.
Not every state followed this pattern. Ferrara, for example, was said to have increased its annual revenues from 70,000 ducats in 1423 to 150,000, with the memorandum attributing this prosperity to its ability to remain at peace during the Italian wars.
The financial figures also present some inconsistencies. Montferrat appears twice, with different revenue estimates, illustrating the difficulties of interpreting a document assembled from information of uncertain origin.
Venice’s Own Finances
Map of Venice in 1525 by Piri Reis
One of the most valuable sections of the memorandum concerns Venice itself. Unlike the brief estimates provided for many foreign rulers, the document offers a detailed breakdown of Venetian revenues, including income from mainland territories, taxes, the salt trade, maritime possessions and other sources.
The mainland territories listed include Friuli, Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, Crema and Ravenna. For several of these territories, the memorandum provides both revenues and administrative costs. Padua, for example, was credited with annual revenues of 65,500 ducats and expenses of 14,000, leaving 51,500 ducats. Brescia supposedly generated 75,500 ducats, with expenses of 16,000, leaving 59,500.
The document also records 165,000 ducats collected annually by the Salt Office, 233,500 ducats from eight offices associated with taxation, and 73,280 ducats from offices connected with the Arsenal. Venice’s maritime possessions were credited with another 180,000 ducats annually.
Additional income came from taxes on property, merchants, clergy and other groups, including specific levies imposed on Jewish communities. The figures are not entirely consistent, and some of the totals do not reconcile with the individual entries. Nevertheless, the detailed accounting provides a revealing glimpse into the financial administration of a major medieval commercial state.
It also helps explain why Venice could exercise influence far beyond the size of its immediate territory. Its wealth depended not simply on agricultural revenues, but on taxation, commerce, maritime possessions and an extensive network of economic activities.
How Accurate Were These Medieval Estimates?
The memorandum is an extraordinary source, but its figures require considerable caution. The first problem is that it measures potential military strength rather than the size of armies actually assembled. A kingdom supposedly capable of raising 50,000 horsemen did not necessarily possess a standing army of that size.
The distinction between soldiers maintained at home and abroad is especially important. The document generally assumes that foreign campaigns would cost approximately twice as much, meaning that rulers could maintain only half as many troops outside their territories.
Second, the estimates concern very different political entities. Some entries describe individual rulers, while others combine several states or territories. The German lands are treated collectively, for example, whereas the Italian peninsula is divided into numerous separate powers.
Third, the document’s chronology is uncertain. Although it includes financial comparisons with 1423, it also refers to rulers and political circumstances from earlier and later decades. These details suggest that information from different periods was combined, and some entries may have been updated while others remained unchanged.
Finally, many figures are implausibly high. The million horsemen attributed to Tamerlane provide the clearest example, but the estimates for several smaller states are also difficult to reconcile with their known resources.
Measuring Power in the Middle Ages
Despite its limitations, the Venetian memorandum provides a remarkable perspective on the political world of the fifteenth century. Its anonymous author was interested in the practical resources available to rulers: the soldiers they could maintain, the money they could collect, and the effects of warfare on their ability to exercise power.
The document also demonstrates the extraordinary geographical range of Venetian interests. Its assessments extend from Scotland and Portugal to Georgia, Anatolia, North Africa and Central Asia, reflecting a political world in which developments far beyond Italy could affect Venetian security and commerce.
Perhaps most importantly, it reveals an attempt to compare medieval states through numerical measures of wealth and military strength. The estimates were often unreliable, but the underlying questions remain familiar: which states were the most powerful, which were growing weaker, and how might the balance of power change?
The source is published as Memorandum of the Power and Revenues of the States of Europe in 142—, in Statistical Documents of the Middle Ages, edited by Roland P. Falkner, Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History, Volume III, No. 2 (University of Pennsylvania, 1896) – click here to read it on Archive.org
The English translation is based on a text published in Ludovico Antonio Muratori’s Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, Volume XXII, pp. 960 ff.
Top Image: Map of Europe by Eren Yetkinler / Wikimedia Commons
How many soldiers could medieval kingdoms raise, and how wealthy were their rulers? A remarkable fifteenth-century Venetian document attempted to answer these questions, comparing the military strength and revenues of dozens of states across Europe, North Africa and Asia.
In the late Middle Ages, the Republic of Venice maintained an extensive network of merchants, diplomats and political contacts. Its leaders needed to understand the resources of neighbouring powers, whether they were allies, trading partners or potential enemies. One surviving document offers an extraordinary glimpse into how the Venetians assessed the balance of power across the medieval world.
Known as the Memorandum of the Power and Revenues of the States of Europe, the document provides estimates of how many mounted soldiers different rulers could maintain, both within their territories and on campaigns abroad. It also records the annual revenues of many states, comparing their financial position with earlier years.
Although the memorandum includes figures dating to 1423, it was not necessarily written in that year. The surviving account contains references to later developments, and the nineteenth-century editor of the translation explains that it was attached to material concerning the Venetian doge Tommaso Mocenigo before 1450. Its anonymous author appears to have drawn on information from different periods.
The figures are not always reliable, and some are clearly exaggerated. Nevertheless, the document provides a fascinating picture of how medieval observers understood the relative power of kingdoms, republics, duchies and empires.
England and France: Two Great Powers Weakened by War
The memorandum begins with France, estimating that the French king could raise 30,000 mounted soldiers from his own territories. These forces would come from the nobility, clergy, towns and other groups owing military service.
However, the document explains that maintaining soldiers on campaigns abroad was considerably more expensive. France could therefore send only 15,000 horsemen beyond its borders.
The report also claims that France had once been capable of raising 100,000 mounted soldiers, before internal warfare devastated the kingdom:
Before the war with their own countrymen, it could have raised 100,000, for that war destroyed both Church and revenues.
This assessment reflects the damage caused by the Hundred Years’ War and the civil conflict between the Armagnac and Burgundian factions. The English victory at Agincourt in 1415 and subsequent conquests had further weakened French royal authority.
England was assigned a similar military strength of 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. The document states that England had previously been able to maintain 40,000, but that warfare had diminished its resources.
The author considered the two kingdoms evenly matched:
In making the test of war these powers are equal. They have always been powerful in their undertakings. And if one of these forces had been greater than the other, one would have been destroyed.
Their finances were also believed to have deteriorated. French royal revenues had supposedly fallen from two million ducats in 1414 to one million, while England’s revenues had declined from two million to 700,000 ducats.
These figures cannot be accepted as precise measurements, but they demonstrate how strongly the memorandum associated prolonged warfare with declining military and financial power.
The British Isles, Scandinavia and Iberia
Scotland and Norway were both described as extensive but impoverished countries. Each was credited with the potential to maintain 10,000 horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad.
The wording is somewhat cautious, suggesting that the rulers of these kingdoms would struggle to maintain such forces with the revenues available to them.
In the Iberian Peninsula, the Kingdom of Castile was credited with 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad, compared with 20,000 maintained in 1414. Their annual revenues, however, had supposedly declined from three million ducats in 1410 to 800,000.
Portugal was estimated to have 6,000 horsemen at home and 3,000 abroad. Its revenues were said to have fallen from 200,000 ducats in 1410 to 140,000.
The memorandum also lists Brittany, whose ruler could supposedly maintain 8,000 horsemen at home and 4,000 abroad. Its revenues had declined from 200,000 to 140,000 ducats.
Another entry concerns the Master of St James, referring to the military order of Santiago. He was credited with 4,000 horsemen at home and 2,000 abroad.
Burgundy and the Italian States
Burgundy was among the most important political powers in Western Europe during the fifteenth century. Its dukes controlled territories in what is now France and the Low Countries, and their wealth and influence frequently rivalled those of kings.
The Venetian memorandum nevertheless assigns the Duke of Burgundy only 3,000 cavalry at home, compared with 1,000 in 1414. Curiously, it claims that he could maintain 5,000 men abroad, reversing the pattern found in most other entries.
Burgundy’s revenues were estimated at 900,000 ducats, down from three million in 1400. The report attributes the decline to warfare.
The Italian peninsula receives particularly detailed treatment, reflecting Venice’s close involvement in its political and military affairs. Milan was credited with 10,000 mercenary horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad. The document names Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan, providing an important clue about its chronology: Sforza did not become duke until 1450. This creates a difficulty with the editor’s statement that the memorandum had been attached to the other material before that year, suggesting that its dating or transmission requires further investigation.
The financial section separately mentions Filippo Maria Visconti, who ruled Milan until 1447. It claims that Milan’s revenues had declined from one million ducats in 1423 to 500,000.
Venice itself was assigned 10,000 horsemen at home and 5,000 abroad, while Florence was credited with 4,000 at home and 2,000 abroad.
Among the smaller Italian states, Savoy was credited with 8,000 horsemen at home and 4,000 abroad. Montferrat, Ferrara, Mantua, Bologna and Siena were each assigned 2,000 horsemen at home and 1,000 abroad. Genoa was also credited with 2,000 horsemen, although the report does not provide a corresponding figure for foreign campaigns.
Florence presents an interesting case. The memorandum claims that it could maintain 1,000 horsemen with its revenues of 1414, but 4,000 at the time of the assessment. Its finances, however, had supposedly declined from 400,000 ducats in 1423 to 200,000 because of warfare.
The Papal States were credited with 6,000 horsemen at home and 3,000 abroad, compared with 8,000 in 1414. Papal revenues were estimated at 400,000 ducats.
Genoa was another state whose military capabilities had supposedly declined. According to the memorandum, internal divisions and warfare had reduced its forces from 5,000 horsemen in 1414 to 2,000.
The document also includes the Kingdom of Naples, where the king of Aragon was credited with 12,000 horsemen at home and 6,000 abroad. The kingdom’s princes could supposedly raise another 4,000 at home. Barcelona and Catalonia were separately assigned 12,000 horsemen at home and 6,000 abroad.
Germany, Hungary and Poland: The Great Military Powers
Some of the largest military estimates were assigned to the states of Central and Eastern Europe. The memorandum treats the German lands collectively, including the Holy Roman Emperor, secular and ecclesiastical princes, and imperial cities. Together, these territories were believed capable of raising 60,000 horsemen at home and 30,000 abroad.
This did not mean that the emperor could automatically command such an army. The Holy Roman Empire consisted of numerous political authorities with different interests and obligations.
Hungary received an even higher estimate of 80,000 horsemen at home and 40,000 abroad, making it the most powerful Christian kingdom in the memorandum by this measure.
Hungary was ruled by Sigismund of Luxembourg, who also held the imperial title. Its position in Central Europe made it particularly important as the Ottoman Empire expanded into the Balkans.
Poland was credited with 50,000 horsemen at home and 25,000 abroad.
The Teutonic Order’s territories in Prussia were assigned 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. According to the report, the Order had been able to maintain 50,000 in 1414, but warfare had weakened it. This decline may reflect the consequences of the Teutonic Order’s conflicts with Poland and Lithuania, particularly its defeat at the Battle of Grunwald in 1410.
The figures suggest that Venetian observers regarded Central and Eastern Europe as possessing enormous military resources, even if these forces were not necessarily available to a single commander.
The Balkans, Greece and the Byzantine World
The memorandum also provides estimates for numerous states in southeastern Europe and the eastern Mediterranean.
Wallachia was credited with 20,000 horsemen at home and 10,000 abroad. The Morea, in southern Greece, was supposedly capable of raising 50,000 horsemen in 1414. Warfare had reduced this to 20,000 at home and 10,000 abroad.
Another entry groups Albania, Croatia, Slavonia, Serbia, Russia and Bosnia together, assigning them a combined force of 30,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad. This broad grouping makes the estimate difficult to interpret, since these territories did not constitute a single political or military power.
Cyprus was credited with 2,000 horsemen at home and 1,000 abroad. The Knights Hospitaller, based on Rhodes, were assigned 4,000 at home and 2,000 abroad.
The document also mentions the Duke of Nicae in the Archipelago, credited with 2,000 horsemen, and the Lord of Mytilene, with the same number. These entries reflect the fragmented political landscape of the Aegean, where Latin lordships continued to exist alongside Byzantine and Ottoman territories.
The Byzantine emperor in Constantinople is also listed, but the military figure was left blank. Further east, the Empire of Trebizond, a Byzantine successor state on the Black Sea coast, was assigned the surprisingly high figure of 25,000 horsemen at home and 15,000 abroad.
Georgia was believed to have experienced a substantial decline. The memorandum claims that its military strength had fallen from 30,000 horsemen in 1414 to 10,000 at home and 5,000 abroad.
The Ottoman Empire and Other Muslim Powers
The memorandum did not limit itself to Christian states. A separate section assesses the military capabilities of several Muslim and Central Asian powers. The Ottoman ruler, referred to simply as the Turk, was credited with 40,000 horsemen. The author describes them as formidable soldiers capable of defending their territories against Christian enemies.
The principality of Karaman in Anatolia received an even larger estimate of 60,000 horsemen at home and 30,000 abroad.
Two other eastern rulers, named Ussun Cassan and the Caraifan in the translation, were each assigned 20,000 horsemen at home and 10,000 abroad. Their identities and the chronology of these entries require caution, particularly because the name Ussun Cassan appears to refer to Uzun Hasan, who became a major regional power later in the fifteenth century.
The memorandum also groups together Tunis, Granada and other North African cities whose ships were said to threaten Christian maritime interests. Collectively, they were credited with 100,000 horsemen at home and 50,000 abroad.
Such entries reflect Venice’s interest in the military and naval capabilities of powers beyond Christian Europe, especially those connected to Mediterranean trade and warfare.
Tamerlane and His Million Horsemen
Perhaps the most extraordinary figure in the entire memorandum concerns the Central Asian conqueror Timur, better known in Europe as Tamerlane. The report claims that he could raise an astonishing one million horsemen at home and send 500,000 abroad. These numbers are almost certainly enormous exaggerations. They also present another chronological problem: Timur had died in 1405.
His campaigns had devastated large parts of Central and Western Asia, and his victory over the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I at Ankara in 1402 had temporarily disrupted Ottoman expansion.
The inclusion of Tamerlane suggests that the memorandum incorporated outdated information or that his name continued to be used as a reference to the military power of the Timurids.
Whatever its explanation, the claim of one million horsemen demonstrates why the document must be treated as an assessment of perceived power rather than a reliable military census.
How Rich Were Medieval States?
Alongside its military estimates, the memorandum provides a separate account of the revenues of several Christian rulers.
These figures, expressed in ducats, offer an opportunity to compare how the author believed the financial resources of different states had changed.
The largest reported revenues belonged to the major kingdoms of Western Europe. France’s annual income had supposedly declined from two million to one million ducats, while England’s had fallen from two million to 700,000. The ruler identified as the king of Spain was said to have experienced an even greater decline, from three million to 800,000 ducats.
Similar reductions were reported elsewhere. Burgundy’s revenues had supposedly fallen from three million to 900,000 ducats, while Milan’s declined from one million to 500,000. Venice’s annual income was estimated to have fallen from 1.1 million to 800,000 ducats. Florence and Bologna were each credited with 200,000 ducats, compared with 400,000 in the earlier estimates.
The earlier figures do not all refer to the same year, ranging instead from 1400 to 1423. The comparisons therefore should not be understood as changes over a single, consistent period.
The striking feature is the repeated claim that warfare had reduced revenues. France, England, Spain, Burgundy and several Italian states were all believed to have suffered substantial financial losses.
Not every state followed this pattern. Ferrara, for example, was said to have increased its annual revenues from 70,000 ducats in 1423 to 150,000, with the memorandum attributing this prosperity to its ability to remain at peace during the Italian wars.
The financial figures also present some inconsistencies. Montferrat appears twice, with different revenue estimates, illustrating the difficulties of interpreting a document assembled from information of uncertain origin.
Venice’s Own Finances
One of the most valuable sections of the memorandum concerns Venice itself. Unlike the brief estimates provided for many foreign rulers, the document offers a detailed breakdown of Venetian revenues, including income from mainland territories, taxes, the salt trade, maritime possessions and other sources.
The mainland territories listed include Friuli, Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Verona, Brescia, Bergamo, Crema and Ravenna. For several of these territories, the memorandum provides both revenues and administrative costs. Padua, for example, was credited with annual revenues of 65,500 ducats and expenses of 14,000, leaving 51,500 ducats. Brescia supposedly generated 75,500 ducats, with expenses of 16,000, leaving 59,500.
The document also records 165,000 ducats collected annually by the Salt Office, 233,500 ducats from eight offices associated with taxation, and 73,280 ducats from offices connected with the Arsenal. Venice’s maritime possessions were credited with another 180,000 ducats annually.
Additional income came from taxes on property, merchants, clergy and other groups, including specific levies imposed on Jewish communities. The figures are not entirely consistent, and some of the totals do not reconcile with the individual entries. Nevertheless, the detailed accounting provides a revealing glimpse into the financial administration of a major medieval commercial state.
It also helps explain why Venice could exercise influence far beyond the size of its immediate territory. Its wealth depended not simply on agricultural revenues, but on taxation, commerce, maritime possessions and an extensive network of economic activities.
How Accurate Were These Medieval Estimates?
The memorandum is an extraordinary source, but its figures require considerable caution. The first problem is that it measures potential military strength rather than the size of armies actually assembled. A kingdom supposedly capable of raising 50,000 horsemen did not necessarily possess a standing army of that size.
The distinction between soldiers maintained at home and abroad is especially important. The document generally assumes that foreign campaigns would cost approximately twice as much, meaning that rulers could maintain only half as many troops outside their territories.
Second, the estimates concern very different political entities. Some entries describe individual rulers, while others combine several states or territories. The German lands are treated collectively, for example, whereas the Italian peninsula is divided into numerous separate powers.
Third, the document’s chronology is uncertain. Although it includes financial comparisons with 1423, it also refers to rulers and political circumstances from earlier and later decades. These details suggest that information from different periods was combined, and some entries may have been updated while others remained unchanged.
Finally, many figures are implausibly high. The million horsemen attributed to Tamerlane provide the clearest example, but the estimates for several smaller states are also difficult to reconcile with their known resources.
Measuring Power in the Middle Ages
Despite its limitations, the Venetian memorandum provides a remarkable perspective on the political world of the fifteenth century. Its anonymous author was interested in the practical resources available to rulers: the soldiers they could maintain, the money they could collect, and the effects of warfare on their ability to exercise power.
The document also demonstrates the extraordinary geographical range of Venetian interests. Its assessments extend from Scotland and Portugal to Georgia, Anatolia, North Africa and Central Asia, reflecting a political world in which developments far beyond Italy could affect Venetian security and commerce.
Perhaps most importantly, it reveals an attempt to compare medieval states through numerical measures of wealth and military strength. The estimates were often unreliable, but the underlying questions remain familiar: which states were the most powerful, which were growing weaker, and how might the balance of power change?
The source is published as Memorandum of the Power and Revenues of the States of Europe in 142—, in Statistical Documents of the Middle Ages, edited by Roland P. Falkner, Translations and Reprints from the Original Sources of European History, Volume III, No. 2 (University of Pennsylvania, 1896) – click here to read it on Archive.org
The English translation is based on a text published in Ludovico Antonio Muratori’s Rerum Italicarum Scriptores, Volume XXII, pp. 960 ff.
Top Image: Map of Europe by Eren Yetkinler / Wikimedia Commons
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