The First Crusade is often seen as a clash between Christians and Muslims for control of Jerusalem. Yet, the reality was far more complex, with alliances that crossed religious lines. One surprising example is a possible temporary alliance between Crusaders and Egypt’s Fatimid rulers—a partnership that may have briefly united Christian and Muslim forces against a common enemy. This article examines how this alliance formed, the motivations behind it, and how its collapse led to the bloody conquest of Jerusalem.
The story begins outside the walls of Antioch, in present-day Turkey, where Crusader forces were in the midst of the eight-month-long siege of the city. According to the History of the Journey of Jerusalem by Albert of Aachen, a group of envoys from the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt arrived by ship for talks with the Crusade leaders. When a relief force came to assist the besieged city, the Crusaders and the Fatimids took up arms against them, routing the relief force:
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…when the Christians saw they had prevailed as victors, and few of their number had fallen, they dismounted and cut off the heads of those killed, tied them to their saddles and carried them back in great happiness to their many comrades who were awaiting the outcome in the camp around Antioch, along with a thousand fit horses and many spoils they took from the defeated enemy. The king of Egypt’s envoys were in that same battle and they also took back the army on their saddles the cut-off heads of Turks.
The Fatimid Empire and Its Complex History
15th-century miniature of the Siege of Antioch from Sébastien Mamerot’s Les Passages d’Outremer
The Fatimids were an Ismaili Shia Muslim dynasty that emerged in the Middle East during the ninth century. Persecuted in the central Islamic lands, the Fatimid leadership established itself in North Africa, where it began to build a state that would eventually become one of the most powerful in the Muslim world. By 969, the Fatimids had conquered Egypt, founding the city of Cairo and establishing a vibrant state that included Muslims, Christians, and Jews living under a relatively tolerant rule. The Fatimid Empire, at its height, included not only Egypt but also parts of North Africa and the Levant, a region rich with diverse communities and a long history of religious coexistence.
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While the Fatimid and Byzantine empires were often in conflict during the tenth century, by the year 998, a series of formal truces had been agreed upon, according to historian Abbas Hamdani in his article “Byzantine-Fatimid Relations before the Battle of Manzikert.” Though relations were at times tense, largely due to the erratic behaviour of Caliph al-Hakim (996-1021), they improved as new agreements were forged. Notably, the Byzantines and the Fatimids delineated spheres of influence, agreeing that Antioch would remain under Byzantine control, while Jerusalem and Damascus would fall within the Fatimid realm. By the late eleventh century, peace between these two states had held long enough to be remembered as the status quo by those who lived through it—a rarity in the medieval world, where alliances were often short-lived.
A Shared Enemy: The Saljuq Turks
The Fatimid and Byzantine empires had a compelling reason to maintain their alliance. By the mid-eleventh century, both were threatened by the Saljuq Turks, a Sunni Muslim dynasty originating in Central Asia. The Saljuqs expanded rapidly, creating an empire that stretched from Central Asia to the eastern Mediterranean. Unlike the Fatimids, the Saljuqs were fervent Sunnis who viewed the Shia Fatimids as heretics, making their rule in the region particularly vulnerable. The Saljuqs’ military campaigns were particularly devastating to both the Fatimid and Byzantine territories, as they brought an organized, well-equipped fighting force against relatively unprepared defenders. The Saljuqs also captured Jerusalem from the Fatimids in 1071, and in doing so, they began to restrict access to Christian holy sites, preventing European pilgrims from traveling to the Holy City.
For both the Fatimids and the Byzantines, the Saljuqs posed a threat that transcended their differences. The possibility of cooperating with a Christian crusading force from Europe to repel the Saljuqs was thus a logical step for the Fatimid rulers, even if it meant a temporary truce with religious adversaries. But for the Crusaders, who had embarked on their journey largely in response to attacks on Christian pilgrims by Turks and Persians, the situation was perhaps less clear-cut.
The Eastern Mediterranean region around 1097 – from Historical Atlas by William Shepherd (1923-26)
An Unlikely Alliance
By the eve of the First Crusade in 1095, Egypt and Byzantium were loosely allied, both seeking to push back against Saljuq expansion. The Fatimid rulers, for their part, had no reason to expect hostility from a European crusading army, especially after receiving word from Emperor Alexius I that armed Christian pilgrims were arriving from Western Europe. In fact, the Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir, an Arabic source, hints that the Fatimids may have even invited the Crusaders into the region:
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It has been said that the Alid rulers of Egypt became fearful when they saw the strength and power of the Saljuq state, that it had gained control of Syrian lands as far as Gaza, leaving no buffer state between the Saljuqs and Egypt to protect them, and that Aqsis [a Turkoman chief] had entered Egypt and blockaded it [in 1077]. They therefore sent to the Franks to invite them to invade Syria, to conquer it and separate them and the other Muslims, but God knows best.
The arrival of the crusader army at Constantinople in 1096 and 1097 marked the beginning of a series of strategic discussions and diplomatic exchanges with Byzantine and, indirectly, Egyptian envoys. Emperor Alexius, who was familiar with the Fatimid situation, reportedly encouraged the Crusaders to seek an alliance with the Egyptians. Alexius likely informed the Crusader leaders, most of whom had sworn oaths of loyalty to him, about his treaties with the Fatimids and expected them to respect these alliances, just as they were supposed to hand any conquered territories back to the Byzantine Empire.
Crusaders Meet the Egyptian Delegation
For the Crusaders, understanding the Middle Eastern political and religious landscape was challenging. Their pilgrimage to Jerusalem was motivated largely by attacks on Christian holy sites and pilgrims, which they vaguely associated with Turks and Persians. However, they were aware that Egypt was a different entity within the Muslim world. The Egyptians, from the Crusaders’ perspective, were a people led by “pagans” who shared some beliefs with the Turks but were also distinct. Much of what the Crusaders knew about Egypt came from the Bible. This was the land where Moses had led the Jewish people out of bondage, but it was also the place where the infant Jesus had found refuge from King Herod. This biblical heritage may have lent a certain ambiguity to the Crusaders’ view of Egypt.
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In February 1098, while the Crusaders were besieging the city of Antioch, a delegation arrived by sea from Egypt. The most detailed account of this visit comes from Albert of Aachen, who describes the Egyptian king’s messengers approaching the Christian army with an offer of alliance:
…the king amir of Egypt, because there had been very severe discord and hatred between him and the Turks long before this expedition of the Christians, and knowing the Christians’ intentions by means of a certain abbot sent as emissary, sent fifteen envoys who were skilled in different languages to the army of the living God, about a mutual alliance for peace and his kingdom, bearing this message:
‘The marvellous king of Egypt, who rejoiced at your arrival and that you have done well so far, sends greetings to the great and small princes of the Christians. The Turks are a race foreign to me and dangerous to my kingdom; they have frequently invaded our lands and held on to Jerusalem, a city which is subject to us. But now with our forces we have recovered this city before your arrival, we have thrown out the Turks, we have struck a treaty and a friendship with you, we shall restore the holy city and the Tower of David and Mount Sion to the Christian people, and we shall have discussions about acknowledging the Christian faith. If, when we have discussed it, it pleases us, then we are prepared to embrace it. If, however, we should persist in the law and the ritual of the gentile faith, yet the treaty which we have between us shall not be broken. We entreat and warn you not to withdraw from this city of Antioch until that which was unjustly stolen is restored to the emperor of the Greeks and to the Christians.’
Although Albert’s account contains some inaccuracies—most notably the suggestion that Jerusalem was already under Egyptian control, which it was not at that time—it reflects the complexity of Crusader-Egyptian relations. Albert is not alone in revealing this alliance. In a letter, the crusade leader Stephen of Blois states that the Egyptians had “established peace and concord with us.” Meanwhile, the twelfth-century chronicler William of Tyre reports that the Egyptian envoys, including members of the Egyptian ruler’s household, encouraged the Crusaders to continue their siege of Antioch. He adds that “the deputies were commissioned to assure the Christians that the sultan would aid them with military support and resources. They were also to try to win the hearts and favour of the leaders and to close a treaty of friendship with them.”
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It was during this visit that crusaders engaged in battle with Ridwan of Aleppo, dated to February 9th, mentioned at the beginning of this article. While other accounts acknowledge that the Egyptian delegation was present for this victory, Albert of Aachen is the only source that states they fought side-by-side against the Turks.
The delegation apparently stayed several weeks with the Crusaders before returning to Egypt, bringing back envoys from the Crusader forces. It seems likely they also returned with some kind of agreement: if the Crusaders could capture and hold Antioch, the Egyptians would retake Jerusalem, and provisions would be made to support the Christian forces in completing their pilgrimage. The deal may also have included promises that the Egyptians would ensure Roman Catholic Christians were given access to key churches and shrines within the city.
Map of Jerusalem, 12th Century
The Breakdown of Relations
One must keep in mind that, at this point, there is little evidence to suggest that the Crusaders intended to establish a permanent presence in the Middle East. Nearly all accounts suggest that the majority of Crusaders intended to return to Europe after completing their pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Antioch was supposed to be handed back to the Byzantines, and while some Crusaders likely desired to see Jerusalem liberated from any non-Christian rule, many would have been content with simply reaching the Holy City. This context helps explain why, after defeating the Turks at Antioch in June 1098, the Crusaders did not immediately march on Jerusalem. Instead, they waited until early 1099—possibly in the hope that the Egyptians would fulfill their part of the alliance and that Jerusalem would be handed over peacefully.
The delicate alliance between the Crusaders and the Egyptians began to falter when, in August 1098, an Egyptian army marched on Jerusalem and laid siege to the city. The local Saljuq garrison surrendered quickly, and soon after, the Egyptians occupied Jerusalem. Their control of the city, however, would not last long.
Upon the Crusaders’ arrival, the Egyptian envoys returned to camp with a new message. William of Tyre reports:
About this time, our envoys who had been sent down into Egypt returned to the leaders. They had gone thither at the request of the Egyptian legates who came to the siege of Antioch by the orders of the caliph of Egypt, as related before. For a year these envoys had been forcibly detained in that country, both by violence and strategy. With them came envoys from the prince of the Egyptians bearing messages whose general import was far different from that of the former embassy.
At the time they had tried earnestly to gain the goodwill and assistance our leaders against the overweening arrogance of the Turks and Persians. Now, however, their attitude was entirely changed. They seemed to imply that they were conferring a great favor on the Christians by allowing unarmed pilgrims to go to Jerusalem in groups of two or three hundred and return in safety after completing their prayers.
The leaders of the Christian forces regarded this message as an insult. They forced the envoys to return with the answer that the army would not consent to go thither in small detachments, according to the conditions proposed. On the contrary, it would march on Jerusalem as one united host and threaten the kingdom of their master.
The Egyptians likely saw their proposal as practical. Jerusalem had just been reconquered and lacked the resources to house, feed, and care for tens of thousands of pilgrims arriving at once. However, for the Crusaders, this proposal meant that many would have to wait months or even years to complete their pilgrimage. After all the blood they had shed, it was unacceptable to them to be denied their right to enter Jerusalem. With preachers like Peter Bartholomew stirring religious fervour and their alliance with Byzantium dissolving (they believed Emperor Alexius had not provided enough support), the Crusaders felt they no longer needed to follow any plan that suggested Jerusalem should remain under Muslim control or that Antioch should be returned to the Byzantines. They were now acting independently, rendering any previous alliances void.
In early 1099, the Crusaders began what was essentially a dash towards Jerusalem, hoping to catch the Fatimids unprepared. At that time, Jerusalem was being demilitarized, with its defences being torn down—suggesting that the Egyptian rulers believed they had a strong alliance with the Crusaders.
The Crusaders arrived at Jerusalem in the summer of 1099 and quickly laid siege to the city. The Fatimids, realizing too late that their previous diplomatic efforts had failed, were unprepared to mount a substantial defense. On July 15, 1099, after weeks of intense fighting and brutal conditions, the Crusaders broke through Jerusalem’s defenses and entered the city. What followed was a bloody massacre, one of the most infamous in medieval history, as the Crusaders slaughtered thousands of Jerusalem’s Muslim and Jewish inhabitants in a fervent display of religious zeal and vengeance.
It should be noted that the Crusaders blamed the breakdown of the alliance on the Egyptians. One chronicler suggests that the Fatimids were secretly negotiating with the Turks—a doubtful prospect given the hostility between the two groups. William of Tyre notes that once the Saljuqs were defeated, the Egyptians’ attitude towards the Crusaders changed: “Hence it was that they scorned the aid of our people which formerly they had so earnestly sought.” Most accounts written from the Crusaders' perspective offer little mention of relations with Egypt before the conquest of Jerusalem, as if these diplomatic exchanges were something best left unremembered.
Legacy of the First Crusade and the Failed Alliance
The alliance—or at least the understanding—between the Crusaders and the Fatimids was a brief and fragile arrangement. Historians have long debated the significance of this episode, with some, like John France, suggesting that the Crusaders’ initial willingness to negotiate with the Fatimids indicates that their campaign was not initially conceived as a holy war against Islam as a whole. Instead, the Crusaders’ primary goal may have been to restore access to Jerusalem, and their willingness to partner with Egyptian Muslims underscores the pragmatic, rather than purely religious, motivations behind the early phases of the First Crusade.
This episode also illustrates the complex, shifting nature of alliances during the Crusades, which were often dictated by immediate political needs rather than rigid religious identities. The Crusaders’ cooperation with the Fatimids challenges the traditional narrative that the Crusades were purely a clash of civilizations, revealing instead a more nuanced picture in which religious and cultural divisions could be temporarily set aside in pursuit of shared objectives. It wasn’t until later, as the Crusaders consolidated their hold over Jerusalem and the Muslim world began to mount counter-campaigns, that the Crusades evolved into a sustained religious conflict.
For the Fatimids, the failure of their alliance with the Crusaders marked the beginning of a slow decline. Their inability to maintain control over Jerusalem or effectively counter the Crusader invasion revealed weaknesses within their empire that would eventually be exploited by rival Muslim dynasties, including the Zengids and Ayyubids. Over the coming decades, these new powers would rise in the Muslim world, transforming the political landscape of the Middle East and leading to a more unified and militarized resistance to the Crusader states.
The First Crusade remains a story of chaotic, unpredictable alliances and rivalries. The Pope and Byzantine Emperor may have had their own visions for how the Crusade would unfold, but the events of 1095 to 1099 defied expectations and took on a life of their own. Driven by a mix of religious fervour, personal ambition, and political opportunism, the Crusaders’ journey to Jerusalem was unlike anything the medieval world had ever seen. The temporary alliance between Crusaders and Fatimids is a reminder that even in an era of stark religious divides, pragmatic alliances could emerge, albeit briefly, between the most unlikely of allies.
The First Crusade’s legacy is often simplified as a battle of Christians against Muslims, yet the nuanced relationships within the campaign tell a richer story. The temporary alliance between the Crusaders and Fatimids challenges the popular conception of the Crusades as solely religious warfare and reveals the pragmatic and flexible approaches of medieval powers when confronted with shared threats.
The Crusaders may have marched to the Holy Land with spiritual aims, but the events surrounding the siege of Antioch and the engagement with the Fatimid envoys highlight that they also navigated a web of political intrigue. The willingness of the Crusaders to work with the Fatimids, at least temporarily, demonstrates that the First Crusade was shaped as much by political alliances and shifting strategies as by religious zeal. This period serves as a powerful reminder that medieval history cannot be fully understood through simplified narratives of good versus evil, Christian versus Muslim, or East versus West. Instead, it was a world of complex motivations and alliances, where pragmatism often rivaled piety.
The attack and capture of Jerusalem, ultimately fueled by the failure of this alliance, proved to be a shock to Egypt and the wider Islamic world, solidifying the perception of Crusaders and Western Europeans as untrustworthy and duplicitous. This moment in history would go on to shape Muslim perceptions of the Crusaders for centuries, setting the stage for further conflict and, eventually, the campaigns of the legendary leader Saladin. The First Crusade, with its unexpected alliances and brutal outcomes, stands as one of the most intriguing and complex chapters in medieval history, a chapter that continues to captivate historians and readers alike.
By Peter Konieczny
The First Crusade is often seen as a clash between Christians and Muslims for control of Jerusalem. Yet, the reality was far more complex, with alliances that crossed religious lines. One surprising example is a possible temporary alliance between Crusaders and Egypt’s Fatimid rulers—a partnership that may have briefly united Christian and Muslim forces against a common enemy. This article examines how this alliance formed, the motivations behind it, and how its collapse led to the bloody conquest of Jerusalem.
The story begins outside the walls of Antioch, in present-day Turkey, where Crusader forces were in the midst of the eight-month-long siege of the city. According to the History of the Journey of Jerusalem by Albert of Aachen, a group of envoys from the Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt arrived by ship for talks with the Crusade leaders. When a relief force came to assist the besieged city, the Crusaders and the Fatimids took up arms against them, routing the relief force:
…when the Christians saw they had prevailed as victors, and few of their number had fallen, they dismounted and cut off the heads of those killed, tied them to their saddles and carried them back in great happiness to their many comrades who were awaiting the outcome in the camp around Antioch, along with a thousand fit horses and many spoils they took from the defeated enemy. The king of Egypt’s envoys were in that same battle and they also took back the army on their saddles the cut-off heads of Turks.
The Fatimid Empire and Its Complex History
The Fatimids were an Ismaili Shia Muslim dynasty that emerged in the Middle East during the ninth century. Persecuted in the central Islamic lands, the Fatimid leadership established itself in North Africa, where it began to build a state that would eventually become one of the most powerful in the Muslim world. By 969, the Fatimids had conquered Egypt, founding the city of Cairo and establishing a vibrant state that included Muslims, Christians, and Jews living under a relatively tolerant rule. The Fatimid Empire, at its height, included not only Egypt but also parts of North Africa and the Levant, a region rich with diverse communities and a long history of religious coexistence.
While the Fatimid and Byzantine empires were often in conflict during the tenth century, by the year 998, a series of formal truces had been agreed upon, according to historian Abbas Hamdani in his article “Byzantine-Fatimid Relations before the Battle of Manzikert.” Though relations were at times tense, largely due to the erratic behaviour of Caliph al-Hakim (996-1021), they improved as new agreements were forged. Notably, the Byzantines and the Fatimids delineated spheres of influence, agreeing that Antioch would remain under Byzantine control, while Jerusalem and Damascus would fall within the Fatimid realm. By the late eleventh century, peace between these two states had held long enough to be remembered as the status quo by those who lived through it—a rarity in the medieval world, where alliances were often short-lived.
A Shared Enemy: The Saljuq Turks
The Fatimid and Byzantine empires had a compelling reason to maintain their alliance. By the mid-eleventh century, both were threatened by the Saljuq Turks, a Sunni Muslim dynasty originating in Central Asia. The Saljuqs expanded rapidly, creating an empire that stretched from Central Asia to the eastern Mediterranean. Unlike the Fatimids, the Saljuqs were fervent Sunnis who viewed the Shia Fatimids as heretics, making their rule in the region particularly vulnerable. The Saljuqs’ military campaigns were particularly devastating to both the Fatimid and Byzantine territories, as they brought an organized, well-equipped fighting force against relatively unprepared defenders. The Saljuqs also captured Jerusalem from the Fatimids in 1071, and in doing so, they began to restrict access to Christian holy sites, preventing European pilgrims from traveling to the Holy City.
For both the Fatimids and the Byzantines, the Saljuqs posed a threat that transcended their differences. The possibility of cooperating with a Christian crusading force from Europe to repel the Saljuqs was thus a logical step for the Fatimid rulers, even if it meant a temporary truce with religious adversaries. But for the Crusaders, who had embarked on their journey largely in response to attacks on Christian pilgrims by Turks and Persians, the situation was perhaps less clear-cut.
An Unlikely Alliance
By the eve of the First Crusade in 1095, Egypt and Byzantium were loosely allied, both seeking to push back against Saljuq expansion. The Fatimid rulers, for their part, had no reason to expect hostility from a European crusading army, especially after receiving word from Emperor Alexius I that armed Christian pilgrims were arriving from Western Europe. In fact, the Chronicle of Ibn al-Athir, an Arabic source, hints that the Fatimids may have even invited the Crusaders into the region:
It has been said that the Alid rulers of Egypt became fearful when they saw the strength and power of the Saljuq state, that it had gained control of Syrian lands as far as Gaza, leaving no buffer state between the Saljuqs and Egypt to protect them, and that Aqsis [a Turkoman chief] had entered Egypt and blockaded it [in 1077]. They therefore sent to the Franks to invite them to invade Syria, to conquer it and separate them and the other Muslims, but God knows best.
The arrival of the crusader army at Constantinople in 1096 and 1097 marked the beginning of a series of strategic discussions and diplomatic exchanges with Byzantine and, indirectly, Egyptian envoys. Emperor Alexius, who was familiar with the Fatimid situation, reportedly encouraged the Crusaders to seek an alliance with the Egyptians. Alexius likely informed the Crusader leaders, most of whom had sworn oaths of loyalty to him, about his treaties with the Fatimids and expected them to respect these alliances, just as they were supposed to hand any conquered territories back to the Byzantine Empire.
Crusaders Meet the Egyptian Delegation
For the Crusaders, understanding the Middle Eastern political and religious landscape was challenging. Their pilgrimage to Jerusalem was motivated largely by attacks on Christian holy sites and pilgrims, which they vaguely associated with Turks and Persians. However, they were aware that Egypt was a different entity within the Muslim world. The Egyptians, from the Crusaders’ perspective, were a people led by “pagans” who shared some beliefs with the Turks but were also distinct. Much of what the Crusaders knew about Egypt came from the Bible. This was the land where Moses had led the Jewish people out of bondage, but it was also the place where the infant Jesus had found refuge from King Herod. This biblical heritage may have lent a certain ambiguity to the Crusaders’ view of Egypt.
In February 1098, while the Crusaders were besieging the city of Antioch, a delegation arrived by sea from Egypt. The most detailed account of this visit comes from Albert of Aachen, who describes the Egyptian king’s messengers approaching the Christian army with an offer of alliance:
…the king amir of Egypt, because there had been very severe discord and hatred between him and the Turks long before this expedition of the Christians, and knowing the Christians’ intentions by means of a certain abbot sent as emissary, sent fifteen envoys who were skilled in different languages to the army of the living God, about a mutual alliance for peace and his kingdom, bearing this message:
‘The marvellous king of Egypt, who rejoiced at your arrival and that you have done well so far, sends greetings to the great and small princes of the Christians. The Turks are a race foreign to me and dangerous to my kingdom; they have frequently invaded our lands and held on to Jerusalem, a city which is subject to us. But now with our forces we have recovered this city before your arrival, we have thrown out the Turks, we have struck a treaty and a friendship with you, we shall restore the holy city and the Tower of David and Mount Sion to the Christian people, and we shall have discussions about acknowledging the Christian faith. If, when we have discussed it, it pleases us, then we are prepared to embrace it. If, however, we should persist in the law and the ritual of the gentile faith, yet the treaty which we have between us shall not be broken. We entreat and warn you not to withdraw from this city of Antioch until that which was unjustly stolen is restored to the emperor of the Greeks and to the Christians.’
Although Albert’s account contains some inaccuracies—most notably the suggestion that Jerusalem was already under Egyptian control, which it was not at that time—it reflects the complexity of Crusader-Egyptian relations. Albert is not alone in revealing this alliance. In a letter, the crusade leader Stephen of Blois states that the Egyptians had “established peace and concord with us.” Meanwhile, the twelfth-century chronicler William of Tyre reports that the Egyptian envoys, including members of the Egyptian ruler’s household, encouraged the Crusaders to continue their siege of Antioch. He adds that “the deputies were commissioned to assure the Christians that the sultan would aid them with military support and resources. They were also to try to win the hearts and favour of the leaders and to close a treaty of friendship with them.”
It was during this visit that crusaders engaged in battle with Ridwan of Aleppo, dated to February 9th, mentioned at the beginning of this article. While other accounts acknowledge that the Egyptian delegation was present for this victory, Albert of Aachen is the only source that states they fought side-by-side against the Turks.
The delegation apparently stayed several weeks with the Crusaders before returning to Egypt, bringing back envoys from the Crusader forces. It seems likely they also returned with some kind of agreement: if the Crusaders could capture and hold Antioch, the Egyptians would retake Jerusalem, and provisions would be made to support the Christian forces in completing their pilgrimage. The deal may also have included promises that the Egyptians would ensure Roman Catholic Christians were given access to key churches and shrines within the city.
The Breakdown of Relations
One must keep in mind that, at this point, there is little evidence to suggest that the Crusaders intended to establish a permanent presence in the Middle East. Nearly all accounts suggest that the majority of Crusaders intended to return to Europe after completing their pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Antioch was supposed to be handed back to the Byzantines, and while some Crusaders likely desired to see Jerusalem liberated from any non-Christian rule, many would have been content with simply reaching the Holy City. This context helps explain why, after defeating the Turks at Antioch in June 1098, the Crusaders did not immediately march on Jerusalem. Instead, they waited until early 1099—possibly in the hope that the Egyptians would fulfill their part of the alliance and that Jerusalem would be handed over peacefully.
The delicate alliance between the Crusaders and the Egyptians began to falter when, in August 1098, an Egyptian army marched on Jerusalem and laid siege to the city. The local Saljuq garrison surrendered quickly, and soon after, the Egyptians occupied Jerusalem. Their control of the city, however, would not last long.
Upon the Crusaders’ arrival, the Egyptian envoys returned to camp with a new message. William of Tyre reports:
About this time, our envoys who had been sent down into Egypt returned to the leaders. They had gone thither at the request of the Egyptian legates who came to the siege of Antioch by the orders of the caliph of Egypt, as related before. For a year these envoys had been forcibly detained in that country, both by violence and strategy. With them came envoys from the prince of the Egyptians bearing messages whose general import was far different from that of the former embassy.
At the time they had tried earnestly to gain the goodwill and assistance our leaders against the overweening arrogance of the Turks and Persians. Now, however, their attitude was entirely changed. They seemed to imply that they were conferring a great favor on the Christians by allowing unarmed pilgrims to go to Jerusalem in groups of two or three hundred and return in safety after completing their prayers.
The leaders of the Christian forces regarded this message as an insult. They forced the envoys to return with the answer that the army would not consent to go thither in small detachments, according to the conditions proposed. On the contrary, it would march on Jerusalem as one united host and threaten the kingdom of their master.
The Egyptians likely saw their proposal as practical. Jerusalem had just been reconquered and lacked the resources to house, feed, and care for tens of thousands of pilgrims arriving at once. However, for the Crusaders, this proposal meant that many would have to wait months or even years to complete their pilgrimage. After all the blood they had shed, it was unacceptable to them to be denied their right to enter Jerusalem. With preachers like Peter Bartholomew stirring religious fervour and their alliance with Byzantium dissolving (they believed Emperor Alexius had not provided enough support), the Crusaders felt they no longer needed to follow any plan that suggested Jerusalem should remain under Muslim control or that Antioch should be returned to the Byzantines. They were now acting independently, rendering any previous alliances void.
In early 1099, the Crusaders began what was essentially a dash towards Jerusalem, hoping to catch the Fatimids unprepared. At that time, Jerusalem was being demilitarized, with its defences being torn down—suggesting that the Egyptian rulers believed they had a strong alliance with the Crusaders.
The Crusaders arrived at Jerusalem in the summer of 1099 and quickly laid siege to the city. The Fatimids, realizing too late that their previous diplomatic efforts had failed, were unprepared to mount a substantial defense. On July 15, 1099, after weeks of intense fighting and brutal conditions, the Crusaders broke through Jerusalem’s defenses and entered the city. What followed was a bloody massacre, one of the most infamous in medieval history, as the Crusaders slaughtered thousands of Jerusalem’s Muslim and Jewish inhabitants in a fervent display of religious zeal and vengeance.
It should be noted that the Crusaders blamed the breakdown of the alliance on the Egyptians. One chronicler suggests that the Fatimids were secretly negotiating with the Turks—a doubtful prospect given the hostility between the two groups. William of Tyre notes that once the Saljuqs were defeated, the Egyptians’ attitude towards the Crusaders changed: “Hence it was that they scorned the aid of our people which formerly they had so earnestly sought.” Most accounts written from the Crusaders' perspective offer little mention of relations with Egypt before the conquest of Jerusalem, as if these diplomatic exchanges were something best left unremembered.
Legacy of the First Crusade and the Failed Alliance
The alliance—or at least the understanding—between the Crusaders and the Fatimids was a brief and fragile arrangement. Historians have long debated the significance of this episode, with some, like John France, suggesting that the Crusaders’ initial willingness to negotiate with the Fatimids indicates that their campaign was not initially conceived as a holy war against Islam as a whole. Instead, the Crusaders’ primary goal may have been to restore access to Jerusalem, and their willingness to partner with Egyptian Muslims underscores the pragmatic, rather than purely religious, motivations behind the early phases of the First Crusade.
This episode also illustrates the complex, shifting nature of alliances during the Crusades, which were often dictated by immediate political needs rather than rigid religious identities. The Crusaders’ cooperation with the Fatimids challenges the traditional narrative that the Crusades were purely a clash of civilizations, revealing instead a more nuanced picture in which religious and cultural divisions could be temporarily set aside in pursuit of shared objectives. It wasn’t until later, as the Crusaders consolidated their hold over Jerusalem and the Muslim world began to mount counter-campaigns, that the Crusades evolved into a sustained religious conflict.
For the Fatimids, the failure of their alliance with the Crusaders marked the beginning of a slow decline. Their inability to maintain control over Jerusalem or effectively counter the Crusader invasion revealed weaknesses within their empire that would eventually be exploited by rival Muslim dynasties, including the Zengids and Ayyubids. Over the coming decades, these new powers would rise in the Muslim world, transforming the political landscape of the Middle East and leading to a more unified and militarized resistance to the Crusader states.
The First Crusade remains a story of chaotic, unpredictable alliances and rivalries. The Pope and Byzantine Emperor may have had their own visions for how the Crusade would unfold, but the events of 1095 to 1099 defied expectations and took on a life of their own. Driven by a mix of religious fervour, personal ambition, and political opportunism, the Crusaders’ journey to Jerusalem was unlike anything the medieval world had ever seen. The temporary alliance between Crusaders and Fatimids is a reminder that even in an era of stark religious divides, pragmatic alliances could emerge, albeit briefly, between the most unlikely of allies.
The First Crusade’s legacy is often simplified as a battle of Christians against Muslims, yet the nuanced relationships within the campaign tell a richer story. The temporary alliance between the Crusaders and Fatimids challenges the popular conception of the Crusades as solely religious warfare and reveals the pragmatic and flexible approaches of medieval powers when confronted with shared threats.
The Crusaders may have marched to the Holy Land with spiritual aims, but the events surrounding the siege of Antioch and the engagement with the Fatimid envoys highlight that they also navigated a web of political intrigue. The willingness of the Crusaders to work with the Fatimids, at least temporarily, demonstrates that the First Crusade was shaped as much by political alliances and shifting strategies as by religious zeal. This period serves as a powerful reminder that medieval history cannot be fully understood through simplified narratives of good versus evil, Christian versus Muslim, or East versus West. Instead, it was a world of complex motivations and alliances, where pragmatism often rivaled piety.
The attack and capture of Jerusalem, ultimately fueled by the failure of this alliance, proved to be a shock to Egypt and the wider Islamic world, solidifying the perception of Crusaders and Western Europeans as untrustworthy and duplicitous. This moment in history would go on to shape Muslim perceptions of the Crusaders for centuries, setting the stage for further conflict and, eventually, the campaigns of the legendary leader Saladin. The First Crusade, with its unexpected alliances and brutal outcomes, stands as one of the most intriguing and complex chapters in medieval history, a chapter that continues to captivate historians and readers alike.
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